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The past five years have seen a trend towards the increased privatization of health 
care in South Africa (SA). Encouraged by a change in government attitudes towards 
the private sector providers, this trend has also found a following within the 
professional medical, dental, nursing and pharmacy associations, and, of course, 
from private hospital owners. What is perhaps more surprising is that it has also 
drawn support from "middle-class" and working-class blacks and their trade unions. 
In fact, to a large degree, the recent privatization trend has ridden on the back of 
increasing black participation in medical schemes (i.e. health insurance). 
The trend is significant for a number of reasons. In the short term, it 
will affect the quantity and quality of health care provided to the bulk of the 
population dependent on the public-sector services. In the long term, the 
structural changes which accompany privatization and the interests which come to be 
vested in that system may present major obstacles to a future, post-apartheid 
government, should it wish to dismantle the private health system. 
Despite its importance, the issue of privatization in SA has, as yet, 
received little serious analysis. Most of the debate has been rhetorical, with 
participants taking up extreme positions. The purpose of this paper is, firstly, to 
document the privatization trend against the background of the economic organization 
of SA's health services at present. Secondly, the paper analyses the change in 
government attitudes in favour of privatization, the collaboration with private- 
sector groupings, and the increasing participation in private-sector health care by 
blacks, particularly as members of trade unions. In considering why this change in 
government policy has occurred, I argue that the primary motivation is financial: 
privatization is seen as a way of easing the state's burden of escalating health 
care costs. 
The third part of the paper examines this question of whether or not, and 
under what circumstances, privatization increases the overall level of fihancing of 
health care. This issue warrants serious consideration, not only because it is the 
basis for the government's present policy; it is also an argument that will 
confront a future, post-apartheid government. For the competing claims for public 
funds will probably be greater for a democratic government concerned with the 
welfare of the masses than it is for the present government, despite the fiscal 
drain of the present security, military and bureaucratic apparatuses. A future 
government is unlikely to be able to afford to offer the whole population the level 
of care which politically powerful black and white communities will be enjoying 
through the private sector. In fact, even if the public sector offered comparable 
care to these urban communities alone, this would severely distort the allocation of 
total public health care resources and might leave the rural masses worse off than 
when the private sector had existed. Thus it may be that privatization would permit 
more resources to be allocated to health care in total, and permit public funding to 
go to those most in need. 
However, this paper is not a complete examination of the arguments for and 
against privatization. In particular, it does not address arguments concerned with 
economic efficiency, financial efficiency, e uit and equality, medical ideology and B Y  the balance of preventive and curative care. All of these would have to be 
considered along with the consequences for the levels of financing in assessing 
fully the merits and demerits of privatization. 
1. Description of the Economic Organization of Health Services in South Africa 2 
The 1977 Health Act congolidated the many health related acts of parliament 
promulgated since 1919. The State Health Department (now called the Department of 
National Health and Population Development) is responsible for overall co-ordination 
of public services, community health matters such as health education and the 
control of communicable diseases, family planning, national laboratory services, and 
the provision of long-term psychiatric services. 
The administrations of SA's four provinces (Cape, Natal, Orange Free 
State, and Transvaal) are responsible for the provision of public hospitals 
(including out-patient departments, day hospitals, maternity departments) for 
personal medical care. City and town councils are responsible for environmental 
hygiene, health promotion and rehabilixation, and for prevention and treatment of 
communicable diseases. The bantustans manage their own departments of health, 
financed out of the central SA state budget. 
1.1 The Extent of Private-Sector Health Care in South Africa around 1983 5 
Health policy debates reflect considerable confusion over just what is meant by 
ftprivatizationlf and "private sectorlt. In particular, the literature fails to 
separate out three distinct components of private health care: (1) the existence of 
multiple private providers and privately owned facilities; (2) the reimbursement of 
providers on a fee-for-service basis; and (3) private sources of funds. In the 
health economics literature, ~~privatization~~ may refer to only one of these three 
components, or to any combination of them. 
To assess the extent of private-sector health care, the economic 
organization of the health sector, therefore, needs to be understood and described 
in terms to these components. To take '*pattern of ownershipt8 first (i.e. who owns 
and controls providegs and facilities): about 50 per cent of doctors are employed 
in the public sector , the rest being either self-employed or employed by private 
industry. About 88% of hospital beds are in state-controlled hospitals. 
The second component of the economic organization of health services 
concerns the methods of reimbursement of providers (and facilities). Three methods 
of reimburs ment are commonly found: fee-for-service, salary/fixed budget, and Q 
capitation. Of the 50 per cent of practising doctors in the private sector in SA, 
most are in private practice, reimbursed on a fee-for-service basis. A few (perhaps 
1-2 per cent) would be salaried, employed in the industrial hospitals, and a further 
few (2-3 per cent) receive capitatien fees for looking after the needs of the 
members of medical benefit schemes. The other 50 per cent of doctors, employed in 
the public sector, are almost all salaried. Of the privately owned hospitals, most 
are "for profit", operated on a fee-for-service basis, and the remainder are owned 
and run by industries for the use of their employees. They do not charge fees-for- 
service and providers are usually salaried (table 1). 
Table.1: Distribution of hospital beds amongst sectors in 1983/4 
Number of beds Percent 
Public 141,210 87.6 
Private Industrial 8,614 5.3 
Private ffee-for-service) 11,437 7.1 
Total 
Source: Calculated from 1985 Hospital & Nursing Yearbook for 
Southern Africa (Cape Town: H Engelhardt & CO, 1985) 
The third component in the economic organization of health services is the 
methods and sources of financing (figw,-6 1). In 1982, total health care current 
expenditure amounted to R3,750 million , 4.9% of the GNP. This had fluctuated 
between 4.2% and 4.9% of GNP over the previous five years. Of this total 
expenditure, 52.1% was financed publicly by taxes and deficit financing. (This was 
about 10% of total public expenditure.) A further 25.1% is spent by medical schemes 
whose income is largely from employer and employee contributions, though some 
schemes are also open to individual membership, i.e. voluntary health insurance. 
Industrial hospitals (i.e. employer-provided health services) accounted for 1.4% of 
' total expenditure. 
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The remaining 21.4% is raised by means of user-charges12 to patients. Fees charged 
at publicly owned facilities are based on a patient's household income and family 
size. Fees charged by private practitioners and private hospitals may either be at 
rates determined by the medical schemes or higher, in which case the patient has to 
make up the difference. Many schemes require the patient to pay 20% of the bill 
anyway. Data on charitable contributions are lacking. However, such contributions 
generally fund research, TB centres, first-aid groups and some community health 
programmes, and are unlikely to contribute more than 1% of total expenditure. 
2. Explaining the Privatization Trends 
The extension of private-sector health care is evidenced by the following trends. 
FirsIJy* over the past five years membership of medical schemes has increased by 
20%. Secondly, although still contributing only a small proportion f the total 
number of beds, the private hopsital industry has grown rapidly, too. l' These 
trends have, in turn, been promoted by three major developments: a) a shift in 
governmental policy in favour of increased private sector participation in health 
services; b) increased collaboration between the government, the professional 
associations and private-sector entrepreneurs; and c) the growing power of worker 
organizations to negotiate, inter alia, for improved medical benefits. 
a) For most of the 1970s the government seemed to view the provision of 
health services primarily as an obligation of the state, tolerating the private 
sector with some suspicion and a good measure of control. In 1974, the government- 
appointed De Villiers Commission argued that not only was it the State's 
responsibility to ensure that health services were adequate but, as far as hospital 
services were concerned, the State should actually provide all such services as far 
as possible. The report was highly critical of the private hospitals for the 
unsatisfactory control of patient fees and fo~~competing with public-sector 
hopsitals in a way detrimental to the latter. 
In  terms of the  l eg i s l a t ion  subsequently enacted, new hospi ta ls  had t o  be 
registered with the  Department of Health. Also, the Director-General of the  
Department and the  relevant Provincial authori ty became the  so le  judges of whether 
new pr ivate  hospi ta ls ,  extensions t o  exis t ing pr ivate  h o s p i t ~ h s  o r  changes t o  
f a c i l i t i e s  within exis t ing pr ivate  hospi ta ls  were necessary. 
Ptk-thermore, over t h e  preceding decade, government involvement i n  a number 
of areas of health care had been increasing, e.g. i n  the  take-over of almost a l l  the  
r u r a l  m i s ~ i o ~ ~ h o s p i t a l s  which were subsequently handed over t o  the  bantustan health 
departments. 
Yet, by 1977, government a t t i tudes  t o  the  r o l e  of  the  p r iva te  sector  were 
changing : 
( 1 ) t  is essen t i a l  t o  note t h a t  the r o l e  of pr ivate  
pract i t ioners  forms an in tegra l  p a r t  of comprehensive 
health service. ... Every encouragement must be given 
t o  the private sector  t o  contribute and expand its 
share i n  achieving a comprehensive health service. 18 (Department of Health, 1978 ) 
By the 1980s there  were frequent statements from government o f f i c i a l s  c a l l i n g  on the  
pr ivate  sector  t o  play a greater  ro le :  
Health au thor i t i e s  must not  be seen a s  an i n f i n i t e  
source of health f a c i l i t i e s  and medical care. More 
people should be able t o  make use of pr ivate  heal th  
f a c i l i t i e s  a s  t h e i r  economic circumstances improve. 
(Dr M H Ross, Department of Health and Welfare, 1982"~) 
It seems c lea r  t h a t  the  government is now taking the i ssue  of pr ivat iza t ion more 
seriously then ever before. Policies which have been implemented t o  achieve the  
greater  use of p r iva te  heal th  services include the  increase i n  f ees  a t  government 
hospitals  so  t h a t ,  f o r  some income groups, it is now more expensive t o  58 t o  public 
hospitals  (e.g. out-patient departments) than t o  pr ivate  pract i t ioners .  A n  
a r t i c l e  describing the  formation of the  Medi-Clinic corporation t o  s e t  up a chain of 
pr ivate  hospi ta ls  pointed out t h a t  
Medi-Clinic's entry i n t o  the  hospital  f i e l d  comes a t  a 
time when r i s i n g  cos ts  of treatment a t  provincial  
hospi ta ls  have encouraged entrepreneurs t o  develop 
independent hospi ta ls  - t o  the  extent  t h a t  more than 
20 a r e  on the  drawing bajfrds o r  under.construction 
throughout the country. 
In another r epor t ,  the Medi-Clinic managing di rec tor  sa id :  
Private hospitals  have a g rea t  future a s  the  
government hands over the medical c of everyone but 
the  indigent t o  the  pr ivate  sector.  ?g 
b j  I n  addition t o  the  change i n  the  government's declared policy towards 
pr ivat iza t ion,  there  has been act ive  collaboration between the government and 
various groupings i n  the  pr ivate  sector.  Since 1980, SYNCOM (Pty) Ltd, a private- 
sector  "think-tank" organization, has received several  commissions t o  research the  
fu ture  of health care  services i n  SA, from i a the Pharmaceutical Society of SA 
(PSSA) and the  Health Strategy Group (HSG). The HSG is composed of t h e  Medical 
Association of  SA, the Dental Association of SA, the Chemical Manufacturers 
Association of SA, PSSA, the  Propriety Association of SA, the  Representative 
Association of Pr ivate  Hospitals, and the  SA Nursing Association. In  August 1985, 
the  Department of Health convened a meeting a t  which representatives of the  
HSG,industry, academia, and the  public sector  deliberated on the  options f o r  
pr ivat iza t ion of health care. Out o f  t h i s  four working groups were established 
which, i n  February 1986, presented t h e i r  consolidated "Report t o  the  Department of 
Health on Pr ivat isa t ion and Deregulation of Health Care i n  SAw - hereaf ter  referred 
t o  a s  the  Report on Privatization.  The main recommendations of t h i s  r epor t  were 
t h a t  "a s t ra tegy of pr ivat isa t ion and deregulation could assist t o  a grea extent  i n  
overcoming these challengesI1 ( i .e .  rapidly increasing needs and demands). 23 
c )  Many black t rade  unions, which have increased dramatically i n  strength 
and membership over the  l a s t  decade, have opted t o  negotiate f o r  health insurance 
benef i t s  f o r  t h e i r  members, f o r  the  following reason. The public sec to r  health 
services a r e  segregated by race. The di f ferent  hospitals  and other f a c i l i t i e s  a r e  
unequally funded and s taf fed,  with whites receiving about 3 t o  4 times more public 
money per capi ta  of the  population than blacks, despite the  f a c t  t h a t  only a small 
proportion of  the  white population depends 92 public-sector services,  compared with 
nearly 90 per cent  of the black population. F a c i l i t i e s  f o r  black p a t i e n t s  a r e  
grossly overcrowded, while many white hospi ta ls  have empty wards. By contras t ,  most 
private-sector services a r e  r a c i a l l y  integrated,  the only c r i t e r i o n  f o r  access being 
a b i l i t y  t o  pay. It is t r u e  t h a t  a f a r  higher proportion of whites than blacks can 
afford private-sector health care: 75 per cent  of  whites and 5.8 per cent  of blacks 
- 16 pLsr cent of the  t o t a l  population - were covered by some medical insurance i n  
1983. Yet, f o r  those blacks who can gain access t o  private-sector care ,  it of fe r s  
a much higher qual i ty  of care than they could obtain through the public sector ,  and 
is f r e e  of individual discrimination on the  bas is  of race. The systematic l ega l  
discrimination along r a c i a l  l i n e s ,  which is the  hallmark of apartheid, dominates 
every aspect of l i f e  i n  SA s o  thoroughly t h a t  it is not surpr is ing t h a t  those 
experiencing it dai ly  should see  inequali ty primarily i n  r a c i a l  terms. Many who a r e  
c r i t i c a l  of r a c i a l  inequali ty,  and many blacks suffering its e f fec t s ,  have been 
quick t o  embrace the apparently ega l i t a r i an  prospects offered by private-sector 
health services. 
A s  a r e s u l t ,  the  increase i n  medical scheme coverage is almost en t i r e ly  
accounted f o r  by the  increase i n  black beneficiaries.  Between 1979 and 1983, the 
number of white medical scheme benef ic iar ies  increased from 3,479,871 t o  3,541,846, 
an increase of 1.8 per cent. Black bene5gciari.e~ increased from 909,334 t o  
1,512,995, an increase of 66.4 per cent. This increase i n  demand f o r  pr ivate  
health care is frequently c i t ed  by pr ivate  hospi ta l  owners a s  a reason f o r  t h e i r  
expansion : 
Medi-Clinic expects t o  benef i t  from the growing numgy 
of pat ients  who a r e  members of medical a id  schemes. 
We came onto the  scene i n  1983 purely f o r  business 
reasons - we didn ' t  do it f o r  chari ty.  We see  
medical services industry a s  an area  of growth. $#le 
The di rec tor  of another hospital  group claimed: 
The projections f o r  the  fu ture  indicate t h a t  within 5 
years, approximately 60% of the  non White population 
w i l l  have some form of medical a id  cover, achieving 
par i ty  with the  White population a t  approximately 95% 
by the year 2000. With the  natura l  growth of  the  
population, coupled with the  growth of t h a t  sec tor  of 
the population covered by heal th  insurance the  need 
f o r  r a t iona l i sa t ion  and redi rect ion of health care 
services b~hween the  public and the  private sector  is 
mandatory. 
Thus, t o  a large  degree, the  growth i n  private-sector heal th  services  
depends on the  growth i n  the number of people covered by medical insurance. This 
growth is due largely  t o  the  increase i n  medical schemes membership amongst black 
employees, a benef i t  which is, understandably, valued and demanded by workers and 
t h e i r  organizations. This is, of course, not independent of government policy 
since,  i f  the  government were t o  desegregate the  public sector  hospi ta ls ,  and lower 
fees ,  the  r e l a t i v e  appeal of private-sector care  might be diminished. 
There are noteworthy parallels between the three developments described 
above and certain elements of the broader tfreformlt s rategy pursued by the 
Government since the late 1970s. These elements include the depoliticization of the 
reform process, the collaboration between government and the business sector, the 
shift of various state responsibilities on to the private sector (e.g housing), and 
the attempted co-option of certain groups of urban blacks by improving their 
immediate living environment and welfare services and by offering them some stake in 
the capitalist system. Indeed, it has been argued that the privatiza3i)on trend in 
health care is quintessentially an aspect of this reformist strategy. According 
to this sort of argument, using health care as an instrument of co-option requires 
not only the provision of better quality health care but also racially integrated 
health services. For the government to accede to this by pouring money into black 
health services and/or desegregating white hospitals would have been enormously 
expensive and politically risky (from the point of view of its right-wing support). 
However, by permitting the private sector services to grow and become racially 
integrated in order to meet the needs of urban blacks, "reformu could be achieved by 
"market forcesw without the government having explicitly to alter its policies. 
This interpretation draws some support fkom comments made by the business 
sector in defending its interests in privatization. In the section entitled 
flAdvantages of privatisation/deregulationtf, the Report on Privatization says: 
A big advantage of this is that it again depoliticises 
the issue since no direct racial or other 
discrimination will be involved, although of course 
the available means will largely determine the extent 
of the choice and equity will be achieved only once 
accegy to the earning of appropriate means is open to 
all. 
And, in a seminar sponsored by the Federated Chamber of Industries, organized by 
SYNCOM, one speaker claimed: 
Politically, privatisation could also have a critical 
effect by replacing political or bureaucratic 
decisions with routine commercial decisions and so 
helping to depoliticise important segments of ever@ 
life - and thus help to defuse the current crisis. 
However, there is little evidence from gaarm#*rt sources that such 
reformist intentions underlie its change of policy towards health service . 
privatization. Indeed, the reformist interpretation of the privatization trend 
apparently contradicts other features of the state's health care strategies, 
especially its persistence with the fragmentation of the health services along 
racial and ethnic lines. The implementation of this policy despite its obvious 
wastefilness, and in the face of widespread opposition even from government 
supporters, can only be seen as part of a strategy to build up the credibility of 
the new ethn& rulers in the tricameral parliament, and of the bantustan 
authorities. Control of health services is one of the few spheres of government 
activity which can be devolved to the ethnic authorities without any real loss of 
power by the central white government. Hence the take-over of almost all the rural 
mission hospitals, which were then given to the bantustan departments of health, and 
and the dissolution of the provincial councils, with the division of their health 
service responsibilities between ethnic administrative bodies. Although the 
financing and functioning of the proposed Regional Sevices Councils are still 
unclear, they too would require control over health services in order to boost their 
power and credibility. 
In terms-of such a strategy, the state needs to increase, or at least 
maintain at present levels, control of the health services. Yet privatization, i.e. 
increasing the proportion of health care provided by individual private providers, 
necessarily contradicts this strategy. Thus the reformist analysis of health policy 
on privatization appears to contradict the analysis of policies of fragmentation and 
increasing control of health services. 
Arguably, they reflect confusion and conflict within the state over health 
policy. Yet, the priority given to the ethnic restructuring of the health services 
surely detracts from the forcefulness of the reformist analysis. Furthermore, 
government spokespeople themselves have been emphasizing a more immediate and 
straightforward reason for encouraging privatization. This is that a combination of 
factors has caused health costs (for both whites and blacks) to escalate in recent 
years. These include: an ageing population, urbanization, a more sophisticated and 
hence demanding population, escalating costs of medical technology, the falling 
exchange rate, and others. This increase has exceeded the rate of inflation as well 
as the rate of economic growth, and therefore demands an ever greater proportion of 
the GNP. If, for various reasons, government cannot cut expenditure in other 
sectors (e.g. military, administrative) and is unwilling to increase taxation or 
deficit financing (because of a.commitment to monetarist policies), then it cannot 
increase public expenditure on health, and any increase must come out'of private 
expenditure. Thus: 
(Clurtailed by the lack of resources, especially 
financial. ... a more active process of privatisation 
of health services is indicated. 
(Dr Francois Retief, Director General o the 
Department of Health and Welfare, 1985 54 
(T)he more people placed in a position to afford the 
services of private practitioners, the less will be 
the burden on the state ... 
(Department of Health 35 
(P)rivatisation of health services ... would lead to 
considerable savings in terms of demands made on the 
central coffers. 36 (Report on Privatization ) 
It seems to me that this is, in fact, the most important factor motivating 
the government's policy of privatization. It is also the solution being promoted in 
many developing and developed countries facing the same problems - viz, how to 
increase the overall level of financing for the health sector once the government, 
for whatever reasons, cannot afford to provide further finance. It is a problem 
which will, in all likelihood, face a future post-apartheid government in SA. 
Competing with many other urgent demands - for housing, water and sanitation, 
education, agricultural development, etc - health care may well rank low on the list 
of priorities. 
It seems relevant, therefore, to address this question: Does 
privatization offer a way for governments to increase the level of resources devoted 
to health care? 
3. How Does Privatization Affect the Financial Resources Devoted to Health Care? 
In the debate on health care financing in SA, privatization has most frequently been 
supported on the basis of the claim that it will result in more funds being made 
available for health care. The argument, common in the international literature, 
usually runs something like this: the level of resources that a government can 
raise and devote to health services will always be less than is required to meet the 
health needs of the whole population. (Indeed, even if the whole GNP were allocated 
to health, this would not meet the total needs.) However, if there are individuals 
or groups of individuals who are willing to pay more for better health services than 
can be provided through the public health sector, this should be encouraged because 
it can release the public funds otherwise spent on these individuals. Thus total 
resources allocated to health services can be increased, agq public health 
expenditure can be concentrated on the poorer communities. 
This type of argument in favour of privatization depends on a number of 
assumptions which are valid only under certain conditions. The following discussion 
identifies the conditions under which each assumption would hold, and shows that . 
these do not pertain in SA at present. It suggests how these conditions would have 
to change in order for privatization to make economic sense as a means of increasing 
the total financial resources devoted to health care. 
The first assumption is that the increased expenditure by other sectors (private 
individuals, medical schemes, employer-provided services) releases public 
expenditure that would have been spent on the beneficiaries of those sectors. Thus, 
for example, 
(The private sector) is self perpetuating and 
independent of government finance. ... (it) is 
therefore not to be considered a drain on public 
funds. 
(Submission from Hoffman Hospital Group to t& 
Browne Commission Enquiry 
However, the private sector is not, at present, "self perpetuating and independent 
of government finance". For, the public sector subsidizes the private sactor in 
numerous ways. 
3.1.1 Tax Concessions. Under corporate tax law, the contributions paid by 
employers are tax deductable, while contributions paid by individuals are abatements 
under individual tax provisions. In 1982, medical schemes1 income from 
contributions was approx3gately 54% of total private health expenditure (26% of 
total health expenditure ), of which at least one-third is subsidizegoby the state, 
i.e. the real cost is 50% more than what employers and employees pay. This loss 
of tax revenue (at least R337 million in 1982) was equivalent to 17% of total public 
sector health expenditure, and more than twice the total amount spent on preventive 
services. 
3.1.2 Subsidies for Medical Education. The major share of the costs of medical 
education is borne by the public sector. This is a form of "human capitaltt 
investment by the state. When the doctor is employed in the public sector, it may 
be assumed that his/her salary undervalues his/her output by an amount equivalent to 
the return to the state on its investment. When a doctor is either self-employed or 
employed by another sector, the additional value accrues to him/her and to his/her 
patients. This value is an effective subsidy to those sectors from the public 
sector. 
Estimates of t& cost to the4state of the undergraduate training of a 
doctor vary from R36,000 to R100,OOO . 937 doctors qualified in 1985, half of 
whom will eventually work in private practice. This is equivalent to a state 
subsidy of between R30 and R47 million (up to 2.4% of public expenditure) to the 
private sector, excluding the costs of postgraduate training. 
3.1.3 Subsidized Use of Public Facilities. Publicly financed facilities are 
usually available to private-sector patients (especially for sophisticated tertiary 
care), but also frequently for routine care under private doctors. Most patients 
requiring emergency admission are admitted to public hospitals regardless of their 
income and whether or not they are covered by medical aid. These patients are 
charged at less than the running costs of maintaining the beds (i.e. ward costs), 
let alone the full-costs of investigation and treatment. In 1984/5, in the Cape, 
the average daily cost for an in-patient at a teaching hospital was R130.14 for 
which the maximum fee of R45.00 was charged. (In provincial non&eaching hospitals 
the costs and maximum fees were R55.45 and R36.00, respectively. Thus the 
government is subsidizing the non-public sectors. 
3.1.4 Other Forms of S ta te  Subsidization. The government, as one of the  largest  
employers, pays employer's contributions so  t h a t  its own employees w i l l  have medical 
a i d  coverage, and be able t o  use the  pr ivate  sector  providers. Many other forms of 
subsidy would be too complicated t o  measure - e.g. the  costs  of t ra ining nurses and 
other health workers, the  cos t  of research, drug tes t ing and control ,  and other 
pa r t s  of the  health service ink'astructure which benefit private-sector and public- 
sector  pat ients  al ike.  
Thus, it is not a t  a l l  c lea r  t h a t  the private sector  does indeed release 
public resources f o r  use on services f o r  those who cannot afford pr ivate  health 
care. It is l ike ly  t h a t  the  individual who uses the pr ivate  sector  costs  the  
government more i n  subsidies 8Qan the  government spends on individuals who depend on 
the  publicly funded services. . The subsidy t o  the pr ivate  sector ,  therefore,  
d i s t o r t s  public sector  resource a l locat ion i n  favour of those who are. already the 
most privileged. 
In  theory, however, there  is no reason why subsidization of the  private 
sector  cannot be reduced. The s t a t e  could qui te  conceivably withdraw tax  
concessions; it could charge pr ivate  pat ients  the f u l l  cos t  f o r  the  use of public 
f a c i l i t i e s ;  doctors who leave the  public sector  could be obliged t o  pay an 
additional tax on t h e i r  earnings, etc.  Withdrawing a l l  subsidies may r a i s e  the  
costs  of pr ivate  health care so  high t h a t  demand is transferred t o  the  public 
sector.  The costs  of meeting t h i s  demand may, therefore, reduce the  n e t  savings t o  
the s t a t e .  Nevertheless, the  assumption t h a t  other sectors re lease  public resources 
which can be directed to higher p r io r i ty  services often ignores the  many ways i n  
which the  public sector  subsidizes other sectors,  and the d i s to r t ive  e f f e c t  t h i s  has 
on public-sector resource allocation.  
3.2 The Second Assumption - t h a t  only private sector services  can r a i s e  funds 
from private sources 
The second assumption i n  the  argument t h a t  privatization increases t o t a l  funding f o r  
health services is t h a t  publicly owned services  a r e  financed from public sources of 
funds, and privately owned services from pr ivate  sources which would not otherwise 
come in to  the  health sector. A s  the  Report on Privatisation expressed it, 
"Privatisation seems t o  imply a s h i f t  towards health as a p e r p a l  responsibi l i ty  
and f ree  and unlimited access t o  health care a s  a privilege1'. 
Yet t h i s  assumption fails t o  separate, and dist inguish between, private 
ownership of services and pr ivate  sources of finance. Privatization of ownership is 
only one way of ge t t ing  pr ivate  individuals t o  finance t h e i r  own health care. For, 
user charges can be a method of financing public sector providers j u s t  a s  it is f o r  
the  fee-for-service providers. Publicly owned services need not be financed 
en t i re ly  from taxation but can d r a w  on other m e t h o d ~ ~ o f  financing a s  well, e.g. 
socia l  security,  health insurance and user charges. 
The argument i n  favour of privately owned services may be based on the  
view t h a t  it is l ike ly  t h a t  more pr ivate  sources of finance w i l l  be mobilized if  
contributors perceive t h a t  they can thereby obtain a be t t e r  than average service. 
Privately owned providers may be perceived a s  offering such a service,  and may 
therefore be necessary as an a l ternat ive  t o  the  public sector  services i n  order t o  
encourage additional voluntary expenditure. Similarly, some methods of financing, 
such a s  compulsory health insurance, may be more acceptable because people perceive 
some benefits  t o  accrue t o  them exclusively as a r e s u l t  of t h e i r  membership. 
However, there  may be ways of offer ing these addit ional  benefits  through the  public 
sector  with uniform quali ty of care. If, a s  was suggested above, public sector  
services a re  charged f o r ,  then coverage through risk-sharing schemes could reduce 
the charges t h a t  pat ients  have t o  pay. Abel-Smith has suggested t h a t  "hoteltt 
benefits ,  such a s  pr ivate  rooms, o r  convenience benefits ,  such as  evening c l i n i c s  
f o r  workers, wider choice of doctors, si9k pay, e tc ,  could be explored a s  
a l ternat ive  incentives t o  contributors. 
3.3 The Third Assumption - that political pressure for public funding will not 
decrease 
The third assumption is that the existence of a private sector would not prejudice 
the amount raised by public methods of financing and allocated to health care. Yet, 
in the presence of other methods of financing from private sources, and alternative 
private praviders, it is likely that the people with political influence (usually 
the relatively wealthy, urban dwellers with regular employment) will not be 
dependent on the publicly financed services. There is a strong chance, therefore, 
that they would not lobby either for increasing the tax effort or for allocating a 
greater proportion of public expenditure to the health services. 
Indeed, as we have seen, the possibility of reducing political pressure to 
improve the public sector services for blacks is presented, in the current SA 
debate, as a reason for privatization. The Report on Privatisation (which was also 
quoted earlier on this) argues: 
Crucial decisions on the allocation of scarce 
resources in a highly sensitive area would shift 
largely from a central politi~al~~ena to the market 
place (depoliticization) (sic)!'. 
It concludes: 
There is ihkely to be an overall saving to the 
taxpayer. 
Yet, this may be one of the greatest dangers of privatization, and result in little 
increase in the total resources allocated to health care and a decline in public 
sources of finance for the health services. 
It is possible, though, that if a future democratic government were 
committed to providing the best public service the country could afford, then the 
existence of the private sector would not reduce the political pressure for raising 
public finances, and therefore total finances could be increased by permitting other 
sectors to operate and raise funds. Roemerls research in Latin America, for 
example, suggested that there was no decrease in the allocation of public funds to 
health services with the growth of the social security systems there. The overall 
level of resources available was, indeed, increased, and he argues that governments 
were atbe to devote larger proportions of their expenditure to deprived rural 
areas. 
To summarize, the provision of public sector services may well cost the 
government more as a result of the shift to private sources of finance and private 
- sector providers. For, firstly, the effect of various subsidies to the private 
sector may be such that few resources are released. Secondly, those funds which are 
released may well be diverted towards the most privileged groups anyway. Thirdly, 
the public sector loses a (potential) source of income as the better-off patients 
who could afford to pay for their health care move to the private sector providers. 
. And, finally, under the present political economic system, privatization is likely 
to reduce political pressure from both whites and blacks to provide adequate funding 
for the public'sector services. 
However, under a different political and economic system, the total level 
of financing for health care could be increased by: 
1) removing subsidies to the private sector - e.g. by abolishing tax 
abatements, levying an additional tax on private doctors' and nurses1 
incomes, charging the full costs to patients treated by private doctors 
in public hospitals, etc. 
2) using user-charges and other private sources of finance for publicly 
owned services ; 
3) making special  benefits  available i n  public hospi ta ls  t o  pa t i en t s  who can 
afford user-charges, t o  encourage them t o  contribute t o  risk-sharing 
schemes and t o  d r a w  t h e i r  patronage back t o  the  public sector ;  and 
4) developing p o l i t i c a l  and f inancia l  mechanisms t o  prevent any decrease i n  
the proportion of GNP devoted t o  those dependent on public methods of 
financing f o r  t h e i r  health care. 
Finally,  I wish t o  re-emphasize t h a t  t h i s  paper has considered only one 
aspect of privatization - viz  how it a f f e c t s  both the overall  l eve l  of funding f o r  
the  health sector  and the level  and allocation of public funds. It has not 
considered other issues,  such a s  the  trade-offs between leve l  of financing and 
equali ty,  efficiency, and curative biases - and many others which must be considered 
i n  developing a policy f o r  the  economic organization of heal th  care i n  SA, present 
and future. 
A more complete discussion of the economic arguments relating to the economic 
organization of health services in SA is presented in M Price, "Health Care 
Beyond Apartheid: economic issues in the reorganisation of South Africa's 
health services", MSc dissertation submitted to the London School of Hygiene and 
Tropical Medicine, 1986. 
Unless otherwise indicated, the data cover the whole of South AfYica, including 
the bantustans. Information is also not separated for the different race groups 
(as defined by the south African government). Such a breakdown of expenditure 
and facilities is important, given the racist nature of health policy. However, 
the analysis here is attempting to identify economic features which would 
pertain even in the absence of such policies, e.g. in the post-apartheid 
society. 
Health Act 1977, Government Gazette, May 1977, 143 (63). 
The bantustan or ffhomelandll policy of the SA government aims at forming 
independent national states on a tribal basis, within the geographical borders 
of SA. Four bantustans are nominally '5ndependenttt and the other six are 
ltself-governinggf. All are economically dependent on SA and none has been 
internationally recognized. 
As a result of various definitional problems, plus the facts that public 
hospital beds are available to private patients and some doctors work in both 
the public and private sectors, analysis of the pattern of ownership and methods 
of reimbursement of providers is complicated. The figures are, consequently, 
only approximations. 
Medical Association of South Africa Bulletin, S Afr Med J, 1986, 69, p 276. 
Many so-called private hospitals recieve up to 90% of their recurrent costs as a 
subsidy from the state. In this paper these have been treated as public 
hospitals, since they are operated on fixed budgets, are not Itfor profit", and 
their fee structure is determined by provincial regulations. 
If reimbursement is by fee-for-service, the provider's income is directly linked 
to the services provided. Where providers are paid on a salary basis, or 
hospitals operated on a fixed budget, income is not related to the quantity or 
quality of care provided. Capitation methods of reimbursement relate the 
provider's income to the number of people for whom s/he is responsible, but not 
to the service provided to each individual. 
This has been calculated on the basis of the annual expenditure by medical 
benefit schemes on general practitioners1 services, as reported in the Registrar 
of Medical Schemes1 1983 annual report. (Specialist and hospital expenses are 
paid on a fee-for-service basis.) 
R denotes the rand, the unit of currency. At the current exchange rate, R1 
equals f0.28, although the purchasing power would be closer to 20.35 in the UK. 
Most of the information in this paragraph and the next is taken from a paper by 
M Zwarenstein, R Dorrington, D Budlender, J Frankish, E Thomson 8 D Bradshaw, 
"Expenditure on Medical Care in South Africa (1978-1982)". The authors were 
kind enough to let me see their preliminary results in advance of submission for 
publication to the S Afr Med J. The original text discusses in detail the 
problems with the data available. Expenditure on health care in the SA Defence 
Force, the SA Police, the SA Prisons Service, and the Department of Education 
and Training have been omitted. Nevertheless, this is, as far as I know, the 
most recent and accurate estimate of health care expanditure in SA. I have 
adjusted their figures to include industrial hospitals (i.e. employer-provided 
health services ) . 
User charges are payments made by patients directly as a way of financing health 
care. They are usually paid at the time of use of a service, though they do not 
have to cover the full cost of the care provided. 
l3 "Healthy Returns", Financial Mail, June 27 1986, p 93. Note: A Spier, of 
SYNCOM, writes t h a t  the  growth r a t e  of membership of medical schemes is 6% 
annually compounded ("Health Care: a s i ck  systemM, The S ta r ,  August 14 1984). 
I could not f ind  evidence t o  support such a high estimate. The f igure  given i n  
the  Financial Mail a r t i c l e ,  of 20% over f i v e  years, seems more reasonable. 
l 
l4 See, f o r  example, "Private Hospitals : big  operations", Financial M a i l ,  April 11 
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l l7 M Price, "Health Care as an Instrument of Apartheid Policy i n  South Africaf1, 
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